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Saving incentives, old-age provision and displacement effects:
evidence from the recent German pension reform
Abstract
In response to population aging, pay-as-you-go pensions are being reduced in almost all developed
countries. In many countries, governments aim to fill the resulting gap with subsidized private pensions.
This paper exploits the recent German pension reform to shed new light on the uptake of voluntary, but
heavily subsidized private pension schemes. Specifically, we investigate how the uptake of the recently
introduced “Riester pensions” depends on state-provided saving incentives, and how well the targeting
to families and low-income households works in practice. We show that, after a slow start, private
pension plans took off very quickly. While saving incentives were effective in reaching parents, they
were less successful in attracting low-income earners, although Riester pensions exhibit a more equal
pattern by income than occupational pensions and unsubsidized private pension plans. We also provide
circumstantial evidence on displacement effects between saving for old-age provision and other
purposes. Households who plan to purchase housing are less likely to have a Riester pension. The same
holds for households who attach high importance to a bequest motive. Occupational pensions and other
forms of private pensions, however, act as complements rather than as substitutes.
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Abstract 
In response to population aging, pay-as-you-go pensions are being reduced in almost all developed 
countries. In many countries, governments aim to fill the resulting gap with subsidized private pensions. 
This paper exploits the recent German pension reform to shed new light on the uptake of voluntary, but 
heavily subsidized private pension schemes. Specifically, we investigate how the uptake of the recently 
introduced “Riester pensions” depends on state-provided saving incentives, and how well the targeting 
to families and low-income households works in practice. 
We show that, after a slow start, private pension plans took off very quickly. While saving incentives 
were effective in reaching parents, they were less successful in attracting low-income earners, although 
Riester pensions exhibit a more equal pattern by income than occupational pensions and unsubsidized 
private pension plans. 
We also provide circumstantial evidence on displacement effects between saving for old-age provision 
and other purposes. Households who plan to purchase housing are less likely to have a Riester pension. 
The same holds for households who attach high importance to a bequest motive. Occupational pensions 
and other forms of private pensions, however, act as complements rather than as substitutes. 
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1. Introduction 
Demographic change poses major problems for public pay-as-you-go pension schemes around 
the world. Many countries have therefore introduced pension reforms which reduce the level of 
pay-as-you-go-financed public pensions. Since this will create a gap in old-age income relative 
to the current benefit level, many governments have accompanied public pension reform with a 
strengthening of funded second and third pillar pensions. In order to accelerate the uptake of 
such pensions, savings are often heavily subsidized, usually in the form of flat-rate benefits, tax 
credits, and/or tax deductions. Sometimes, these subsidies are targeted, e.g. for low-income 
individuals or families with children. 
Do these subsidies work? This is the key question addressed by this paper. We exploit the 
recent German pension reform in order to shed new light on this question. Specifically, we are 
interested in public acceptance of the new pension plans and its dynamics over time. Moreover, 
we want to better understand the distributional aspects: for whom the saving incentives work, 
i.e., who has joined the new subsidized pension scheme, and who is likely to be left with a 
pension gap. Finally, we investigate whether the new private pension plans displace saving for 
other purposes. 
Voluntary, but highly subsidized supplemental private pensions, so-called “Riester pensions,” 
were introduced in 2001 as part of a general overhaul of the German pension system.1 
Subsidies increased in a step-wise fashion from 2002 until 2008, allowing us to identify the 
effects of subsidies on uptake rates. We use the German SAVE data, a new panel data set on 
households' saving and asset choices, socio-demographic characteristics, and psychological 
determinants of saving and old-age provision behavior. Currently, the SAVE data capture the 
                                                 
1 In essence, the formerly monolithic German pay-as-you-go system is transiting to a multi-pillar system with 
public, occupational and private pensions. For a detailed description of the pension reform process in Germany 
see Börsch-Supan and Wilke (2004). The “Riester pensions” are named after Walter Riester, former German 
Secretary of Labor and Social Security, who introduced the 2001 pension reform. 
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time period between 2001 and 2006 and offer a unique opportunity to investigate old-age 
provision based on very recent data with a broad set of explanatory variables. 
The issues investigated in our paper contribute to the discussion about the impact of retirement 
saving incentives in various countries. In the U.S., Venti and Wise (1990) on the one side and 
Gale and Scholz (1994) on the other side have sparked a very controversial discussion about 
the efficacy of Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) as saving devices; see Skinner and 
Hubbard (1996) for an early review. Disney et. al. (2001) have provided a helpful review 
tailored to the UK situation. These controversies have accompanied pension reform in almost 
all developed countries, generating an interest in cross-national analyses of retirement saving 
behavior under different tax and subsidy regimes, see Börsch-Supan (2003, 2004). This paper 
adds the recent German experience to this discussion. 
The paper is also linked to recent research in behavioral economics and complements the 
laboratory evidence on behavior in complex dynamic decision situations (e. g., Schunk and 
Winter, 2007) with experiences from real-life decision situations, specifically decisions about 
old-age provision. Our paper provides striking evidence that the uptake of Riester pension 
plans occurred only after substantial simplifications had been made. This provides evidence 
that customers are deterred by overly complex pension products which are not easily 
understood. It also adds to the evidence provided by Madrian und Shea (2001) who 
demonstrated that the decision for or against specific pension products depends to a large 
extent on how the different products were presented. Moreover, we find that the extent of 
information about the pension system is a key factor in the participation decision. This has 
been suggested by Boeri et al. (2002). Many respondents in our sample lack the information 
deemed necessary for taking the appropriate retirement saving decisions (Lusardi and Mitchell, 
2006). This lack of information is particularly high among respondents with low education and 
income, confirming U.S. results by Lusardi (1999). 
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Therefore, it is not surprising that we find striking differences in private pension enrolment by 
socio-demographic characteristics. We find that these enrolment patterns do not always follow 
the incentive scheme. In many case, they better fit the patterns predicted by the availability of 
information about the pension system. In general, households with higher levels of educational 
attainment and households in the middle and upper income brackets are more likely to make 
use of Riester subsidies than low-income and low-education households. 
Finally, we provide circumstantial evidence for displacement effects. For example, households 
who plan to purchase housing property are less likely to enrol in a Riester pension plan. The 
same holds for households who attach high importance to a bequest motive. Occupational 
pensions and other forms of private pensions, however, act as complements rather than as 
substitutes. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets the stage by presenting the 
key institutional features of subsidized pension schemes in Germany and the uptake of Riester 
pensions between 2001 and 2006. Sections 3 and 4 provide descriptive and econometric 
evidence on the dynamics of enrolment in Riester pension plans by socio-economic and 
psychological characteristics. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The Incentives for Riester pensions 
While Riester pensions are voluntary, they have been designed to fill the gap that will be 
created by the scheduled reduction of public pension benefits in response to the pressures of 
population aging. In order to achieve this aim, the German Retirement Savings Act2 introduced 
a comprehensive regime of saving incentives for certified pension products (“Riester 
pensions”). These retirement saving plans are eligible for subsidies in the form of flat-rate 
benefits or tax relief. Initially, certification regulations and subsidy mechanisms were rather 
                                                 
2 The law „Altersvermögensgesetz “ stems from 2001. 
 5
complex, but they were significantly simplified in 2005. We first describe the initial situation 
because it bears many lessons for effective subsidy design. 
2.1 Initial criteria and incentives 
Criteria for “certifiable” products. Initially, private pension plans were eligible for subsidies if 
they fulfilled eleven criteria stipulated by the Certification of Retirement Pension Contracts 
Act. These criteria included, among others, the following requirements: savers must make 
regular contributions; providers must guarantee that the nominal rate of return in each calendar 
year be strictly positive; pension benefits must be disbursed as certain types of lifelong 
annuities; lump sum payments at retirement must not exceed 20% of the accumulated wealth; 
administrative and marketing costs must be spread over at least ten years; and all providers 
must register at a supervisory board. 
Eligibility. Not all households are eligible for the subsidies. The eligibility criteria are 
complex, although the intension was that everyone affected by the reduction in public pension 
benefits should be eligible for private pension subsidies. Hence, the group of eligible 
beneficiaries includes employees paying mandatory social insurance contributions; recipients 
of wage compensation benefits (such as unemployment benefit, child-raising benefits, etc.); 
self-employed people who are mandatory members of the public pension system; farmers; and 
tenured civil servants.3 Spouses of eligible individuals are also entitled to receive subsidies 
(“indirect entitlements") provided that they enroll in a separate pension plan of their own.  
Subsidies. Due to government budget constraints, the subsidy scheme was phased in step-by-
step, starting in 2002 and ending in 2008, doubling the applicable parameters in each step. This 
is shown in Table 1. Column 1 shows the percentage of gross earnings which must be 
                                                 
3 The precise definition of persons eligible for state subsidies is very complicated. Reform proposals include 
widening entitlements to the entire active population or all tax payers. Simpler eligibility rules are expected to 
increase uptake more than proportionally. Such a reform would also reach individuals with very low levels of 
social security – such as people in low-income “mini jobs” or the part-time self-employed (Social Advisory 
Council 2006, Commission for the Sustainable Financing of the German Social Security System 2004). 
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contributed to the plan in order to qualify for the full subsidy. The full subsidy is displayed in 
columns 2-4 and has three elements. First, there is a flat-rate benefit (column 2) for low and 
middle income households. Individuals eligible for this flat-rate benefit pay their savings into a 
certified pension plan and file an application form for subsidies each year. The plan provider 
receives the flat-rate benefit and credits it to the account as part of the total contribution. 
Second, all eligible savers receive an additional benefit for each child (column 3). Third, 
contributions to Riester pension plans can be tax deductable as special expenses up to a 
maximum amount (column 4). This amount has been fixed in nominal terms at €2100 from 
2008 onwards which will, unless changed, eventually erode this third subsidization 
mechanism.4 
Table 1: State incentives for supplementary pension provision. 
 Maximum contribution 
[percentage of gross 
earnings] 
Basic benefit  
[€ p. a.] 
Child benefit 
 [€ p. a.] 
 
Maximum tax 
deduction 
 [€ p. a.] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
2002 1 38 46 525 
2004/05 2 76 92 1050 
2006 3 114 138 1575 
2008 4 154 185* 2100 
Note: * The child allowance is €300 for children born after 2007. 
Subsidies are reduced proportionally if contributions to the Riester plan are lower than the 
maximum indicated in column 1. Since the subsidy itself is counted as part of that contribution, 
some mathematical skills are required to compute the exact own contribution required for the 
full subsidy – another feature reducing the transparency of the subsidy design. Moreover, the 
minimum own contribution depended on the number of children and the year in which the 
Riester plan was signed. 
                                                 
4 An automatic inflation adjustment was suggested for instance by the Commission for the Sustainable Financing 
of the German Social Security Systems (2004), of which one author was a member, and Sommer (2007). 
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The complexity of the design has distracted households from the substantial depth of the 
subsidies. While low earners receive a relatively high subsidy due to the flat-rate subsidy, 
higher earners benefit additionally from the tax deductions. Overall, the subsidies average 
about 45% of contributions, varying between 24% and 90% depending on income and number 
of children, and generated annual expenditures of 740 million Euro in 2007.5 
Use for the purchase of real estate. Another institutional feature is worth mentioning because 
it affects potential displacement effects discussed in Section 4. While savings usually must be 
accumulated until retirement and then disbursed in some type of annuity, there is an exception 
for owner-occupied housing where between €10,000 and €50,000 may be withdrawn from the 
accumulated capital for the purpose of purchasing owner-occupied property. The amount 
withdrawn must be paid back into the pension plan in monthly instalments by the age of 65; 
otherwise the subsidies must be paid back. 
2.2  Uptake of “Riester pensions” and amended eligibility criteria 
Quarterly uptake figures are provided by the Federal Ministry for Labor and Social Affairs and 
displayed in Figure 1. 
                                                 
5 See Bundesbank (2002). 
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Figure 1: Development of Riester pensions 
 
 
Source: Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales (2006) 
Around 1.4 million Riester pension plans were taken up in the first year after the introduction 
of incentives.6 After a period of initial enthusiasm, however, demand for Riester pensions 
flattened in 2003 and 2004. This lackluster development and widespread criticism of the 
complex eligibility and subsidy design led to simplification in 2005 in an attempt to improve 
acceptance by households and providers:  
1. The application procedure was simplified by replacing it with a one-off permanent 
benefit application. Savers eligible for subsidies can now authorize their pension 
provider to submit an allowance application on their behalf every year. 
2. The number of certification criteria was reduced from 11 to 5. Specifically, the amount 
to be annualized was reduced from 80 to 70 percent. 
3. The saver's minimum own contribution is now standardized to €60 per annum.  
4. The information duties of pension providers was extended. Information about 
investment options, the structure of the portfolio and the risk potential were also given. 
Providers were required to introduce a standardised calculation facilitating comparisons 
of alternative products. 
                                                 
6 For an analysis of the initial phase see Dünn and Fasshauer (2003). 
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5. Acquisition and marketing costs can now be spread over five rather than ten years; 
thereby selling Riester pensions became more attractive for providers. 
Demand for Riester pensions rose significantly in 2005 after these changes came into effect, 
see Figure 1. Around 900,000 new policies – around four times as many as during the whole of 
2004 – were signed in the last quarter of 2005 alone. This upward trend continued throughout 
2006. By the end of 2006, a total of more than 8 million pension plans eligible for subsidy 
support had been taken up. About 37 million individuals are estimated to have been eligible for 
subsidies (Sommer 2007); hence, coverage is about 23%. 
Besides the quarterly uptake figures, there is only limited information on socio-economic 
characteristics provided by the Central Riester Subsidy Office. Stolz and Rieckhoff (2005, 
2006) claim that individuals with low labor incomes, women, families, and employees in East 
Germany are well represented among subsidy recipients. Stolz and Rieckhoff therefore suggest 
that social policy objectives have been achieved.7 
3. Uptake by socio-economic class using the SAVE data 
The aggregate numbers analyzed by Stolz and Rieckhoff do not precisely tell us which 
population groups are covered by Riester pensions. They do not contain household income, 
specifically income not due to social security taxes and income from individuals indirectly 
entitled to Riester subsidies. Hence, they do not provide a sound statistical basis to study the 
distributional aspects of the subsidy scheme. Moreover, the aggregate figures do not give 
information about possible displacement effects; for example, they do not show competing 
products for old-age provision (which are not subsidized) or any other savings. 
                                                 
7 56.1% of beneficiaries were female and 43.9% male in the contribution year 2003. 29% of those receiving 
allowances were from the new federal states in eastern Germany, 71% from the former territory of West Germany. 
Around 2.4 million people received a basic allowance and 1.1 million people an additional child's allowance. 
These shares remained more or less unchanged in 2004. 
 10
This and the following section therefore use new micro data, the SAVE panel, to shed light on 
these issues. We first briefly describe this data set, and then present bivariate descriptive 
statistics shedding light on the socio-economic status of the subsidy recipients. Section 4 
deepens the analysis by employing a multivariate regression approach. 
3.1 The SAVE data 
SAVE is a new longitudinal data set containing information on households' saving and asset 
choices, socio-demographic characteristics, and psychosocial determinants of savings behavior, 
particularly related to old-age provision.8 The SAVE data offer the unique opportunity to 
investigate saving and old-age provision because the data is released very timely and includes a 
broad variety of explanatory variables. In each year, the survey asked households about their 
financial decisions in the previous year. Thus far, the panel was surveyed in 2001, 2003, 2005, 
2006 and 2007. 
The unit of SAVE is the respondent and the respondent's spouse (referred to in the following as 
household). In 2006, the total sample size was about 3500 households. We restrict the analysis 
in this paper to those households who have not yet retired.9 All descriptive statistics in this 
paper are weighted. The weights are based on the income and age distribution of the German 
Microcensus.10 
3.2 Dynamics of uptake 
Figure 2 shows how the proportion of households making supplementary provision for old age 
developed between 2000, the year before the Riester reform, and 2005. Supplementary pension 
                                                 
8 See Börsch-Supan et al. (2008) for a detailed description of the dataset. Essig (2005) and Schunk (2006) provide 
further details. We are grateful to the German Science Foundation (DFG) for funding this data set. 
9 To be precise: the interview is conducted with the individual who knows best about the household's finances. 
10 As in all surveys that deal with sensitive topics such as household finances, item non-response to sensitive 
questions is not ignorable (see Essig and Winter (2003) and Schunk (2006) for discussion and documentation). To 
prevent biased inference based on an analysis of complete cases only, an iterative multiple imputation procedure 
has been applied to the SAVE data (Schunk, 2008). Multiple imputation simulates the distribution of missing data 
and allows for a more realistic assessment of variances in subsequent analyses than single imputation. The 
procedure uses a Markov-Chain Monte-Carlo method to replace missing data by draws from an estimate of the 
conditional distribution of the data (Hoynes et al. 1998, Kennickell 1998). All results in this paper use the fully 
imputed SAVE data. 
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provision is broadly defined including occupational pensions, state-subsidized pension 
products, and all other forms of private old-age provision such as private pension schemes 
which are not eligible for direct state support or which were started before the subsidy scheme 
was introduced.11 
Figure 2: Spread of private pension provision 
Proportion of households with occupational pensions, 
Riester-pensions and other pension schemes
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Source: Own calculations based on SAVE 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006, non-retired households.  
Note: The thin line shows the 90% confidence interval. Weighted figures. 
Figure 2 shows that the proportion of households with supplementary pension provision grew 
enormously from 17% to 43% in the few years between 2000 and 2005. This development is 
remarkable in a country such as Germany which features a first pillar of retirement income 
support that has traditionally been extremely dominant. The aggregate replacement rate 
(average net pension income divided by average net wage income) is currently about 70%. 
Even after the recent reforms, it is scheduled to be above 55% in 2030 when population aging 
reaches its peak. This is still substantially higher than the current replacement rate of 48% in 
the U.S. 
                                                 
11 For the precise wording of the question in the questionnaire refer to question 1 in the appendix. 
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Which different forms of supplemental pension provision have contributed to this 
development? We distinguish between occupational pensions, subsidized Riester pensions, and 
other unsubsidized private pension instruments.12 Figure 3 shows how these three vehicles of 
private old-age provision have developed in the period from 2002 to 2005.13  
Figure 3: Spread of different private pension instruments 
Proportion of households with different kinds of pension 
schemes
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Source: Own calculations based on SAVE 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006, non-retired households.  
Note: The thin line shows the 90% confidence interval. Weighted figures. 
There has been a marked increase in all three instruments. The proportion of households with 
occupational pensions almost doubled between 2002 and 2005, and so did the share of 
households with unsubsidized private pensions. The share of households with Riester pensions 
almost tripled. 
Unsubsidized private pensions are still more widespread than Riester pensions. Between 2004 
and 2005, i.e., just before the changes in the legislation making Riester pensions more 
transparent, unsubsidized pensions even grew faster than the Riester pensions, in spite of the 
high subsidy levels. In addition to the intransparent design of Riester products, other possible 
                                                 
12 See the appendix for the exact wording of the question in the SAVE survey instrument covering these products. 
13 The year 2000 has not been taken into account as pension provision had not been included in the SAVE 
questionnaire before the introduction of the Riester pension. 
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explanations include the demand by households who are ineligible for state subsidies, a shift in 
demand towards private pensions as a response to the abolishment of tax benefits for whole life 
insurance policies, and a preference for more flexible and potentially higher profit-yielding 
products. 
The large proportion of households with supplemental pension plans may disguise the fact that 
some households have several plans while others have none at all. Figure 4 therefore shows 
how many households subscribe to more than one supplemental pension scheme. 
Figure 4: Households with several pension instruments 
Proportion of households with different kinds of suppl. old-
age provision
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Source: Own calculations based on SAVE 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006, non-retired households.  
Note: The thin line shows the 90% confidence interval. Weighted figures. 
Indeed, combining several instruments is common. While Figure 4 shows that the share of 
households without any supplemental pension instrument has declined, it is still more than half 
of the population. In 2002, three quarters of households had neither their own occupational 
pension nor a Riester or any other private pension. In 2005, this was still true for about 57% of 
households. If whole life insurance policies are also taken into account (not depicted in Figure 
4), this percentage declines to 38%. Compared to Anglo-Saxon countries, the saturation point 
has clearly not yet been reached in Germany. 
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The proportion of households with several pension instruments also increased in the observed 
period. This suggests that the increasing prevalence of supplemental pensions is not simply due 
to households which had not previously made private provision for old age, but is also 
increasingly due to the number of households which use several such instruments. 
3.3 Uptake by household characteristics 
We now examine which households – stratified by age, number of children, education, and 
income – were actually reached by the various supplemental pension schemes.14 
Supplementary pension uptake by age 
When examining the prevalence of demand for private pensions by age, one would expect to 
find differences because the replacement rate of the public pension system will slowly decline 
in response to population aging. Younger generations are thus more strongly affected than 
older generations. One would therefore anticipate higher participation rates among younger 
households relative to among older ones. 
                                                 
14 For a similar study of supplementary pension provision in the United Kingdom, see Disney et. al (2001).  
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Figure 5: Supplementary pension provision by age group in 2005 
Proportion of households with private pension schemes
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Source: Own calculations based on SAVE 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006, non-retired households.  
Note: The thin line shows the 90% confidence interval. Weighted figures. 
The distribution of Riester pensions across age groups in Figure 5 more or less reflects this 
anticipated profile. Despite the high rate of return which heads of household aged 50 to 59 can 
expect to receive with a Riester pension, fewer older households have taken out a Riester 
pension than younger ones. Riester pensions are most common in the group aged 30 to 49, 
which also includes the baby boom generation which will be most affected by the lower 
replacement rate of future public pension benefits. Participation is also significantly lower 
among younger households; partly because many members of these households are not yet 
gainfully employed, e.g. in training or education. In addition, this age group has fewer children 
and thus receives a lower subsidy. The data reflects this in a higher proportion of younger 
rather than older households which hold unsubsidized private pension instruments. 
Supplementary pension uptake by number of children 
Figure 6 shows the strong positive relationship between the number of children and the 
proportion of households with a Riester pension plan. As pointed out in Table 1, Riester 
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subsidies increase linearly with the number of children. Hence, it is not surprising that there is 
strong demand for Riester products among parents with more than two children. 
Figure 6: Demand for private pensions by number of children in 2005 
Proportion of households with private pension schemes
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Source: Own calculations based on SAVE 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006, non-retired households.  
Note: The thin line shows the 90% confidence interval. Weighted figures. 
One in five households with two or more children – almost twice as many as among childless 
households – had a Riester pension plan in 2005. Another striking finding is that Riester 
pensions are particularly popular with larger families with children. This is confirmed by the 
development over time shown in Table 2 for the period 2002 to 2005 when Riester pension 
plans were proliferating most markedly among households with more than 3 children. 
Table 2: Development by number of children 
Pension provision by number of children   
2005 (change from 2002)    
      
  
Occupational 
pension 
Riester-
pension 
Other pension 
schemes 
Number of children       
none 17% (+7) 12% (+8) 24% (+13) 
1 child 27% (+13) 15% (+9) 23% (+11) 
2 children 25% (+9) 19% (+12) 18% (+7) 
3 children 20% (+3) 21% (+12) 22% (+10) 
more than 3 17% (+5) 23% (+17) 15% (+10) 
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Supplemental pension uptake by education 
As pointed out in the introduction, demand for private pension provision is closely related to 
knowledge about financial issues in general, and information about the social security system 
in particular. More specifically, the awareness of supplementary pension provision and the 
willingness to postpone consumption today for more consumption tomorrow is contingent on 
knowledge about the conditions attached to state subsidies and the various take up options 
available.  
Figure 7 shows the proportion of households investing in old-age provision by vocational 
qualification which we use as an indicator for financial knowledge.  
Figure 7: Demand for private pensions by vocational training in 2005 
Proportion of households with private pension schemes
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Source: Own calculations based on SAVE 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006, non-retired households.  
Note: The thin line shows the 90% confidence interval. Weighted figures. 
Indeed, the presence of vocational training and the uptake of supplementary pension provision 
are positively related. The prevalence of occupational pensions among university graduates is 
particularly high. Riester pensions are now equally common among heads of household with 
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intermediate and higher educational qualifications.15 While there has been an increase in the 
number of supplemental pension plans held by households without any vocational training 
across all three schemes, the increase in the number of occupational and Riester pensions since 
2002 trails behind that of the other two education groups. 
Table 3: Development by vocational training between 2002 and 2005 
Demand for private pensions by vocational training   
2005 (change from 2002)    
      
  
Occupational 
pension 
Riester-
pension 
Other pension 
schemes 
Vocational training       
None  8% (+4) 6% (+3) 9% (+8) 
Professional training 23% (+8) 18% (+11) 20% (+9) 
University degree 27% (+10) 18% (+10) 31% (+13) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on SAVE 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006, non-retired households.  
Note: Weighted figures. 
 
Supplemental pension uptake by income 
Finally, we consider the relationship between income and the demand for supplementary 
pension provision. Figure 8 shows that the proportion of households holding private pension 
instruments increases with growing disposable household income. This pattern is most 
apparent for occupational pensions. Around 7% of households in the lowest income bracket 
have taken up Riester pension plans, while about a third is in the upper income bracket. It is 
remarkable that Riester pensions are much more equally distributed by income than 
occupational pensions or unsubsidized private pension schemes. 
                                                 
15 Looking at educational levels shows that people leaving school with a lower secondary school qualification 
make somewhat less provision for old age in any of the forms considered here than do heads of household with a 
secondary school leaving certificate or general university entrance qualification. While there are no differences 
between people holding a secondary school leaving certificate and those with higher qualifications as far as 
Riester pensions are concerned, occupational pensions are much more common among more highly educated 
heads of household. Overall, the differences are larger if we differentiate by vocational qualifications.  
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Figure 8: Demand for private pensions by monthly household disposable income in 2005 
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Source: Own calculations based on SAVE 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006, non-retired households.  
Note: Weighted figures. 
All income groups have exhibited an increasing demand for supplemental pensions since 2002, 
see Table 4. Starting from an already lower initial level, the increase in percentage points is 
least apparent in the lowest income bracket. This effect is less pronounced when expressed in 
relative percentage terms. Particularly striking is the impressive growth of occupational 
pensions and unsubsidized private pension instruments among high income households. 
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Table 4: Development by income brackets between 2002 and 2005 
Demand for private pensions by monthly disposable household income 
2005 (change from 2002)     
      
  
Occupational 
pension Riester-pension 
Other pension 
schemes 
Income bracket       
0 - 999 EUR 3% (+2) 7% (+4) 10% (+5) 
1000 - 1999 EUR 15% (+5) 17% (+10) 18% (+10) 
2000 - 3999 EUR 32% (+13) 20% (+12) 25% (+10) 
> 4000 EUR 45% (+23) 21% (+14) 40% ( +25) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on SAVE 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006, non-retired households.  
Note: Weighted figures. 
 
Table 5 focuses on Riester pensions. It shows the development between 2004 and 2005 and 
provides some idea about the dynamic development in the four income brackets. 
Table 5: Riester pension plans by income brackets in 2004 and 2005 
Monthly disposable household income [€] 0-999 1000-1999 2000-3999 Over 4000
 2004 
 Participation rate 4.4% 10.5% 16.0% 17.1% 
 2005 
Participation rate 7.3% 17.0% 20.0% 20.9% 
 
An important result from Table 5 is the markedly lower increase of the share of households 
with Riester pension plans in the lower income range since 2004. This finding is at odds with 
the data from the Central Riester Subsidy Office described in section 2 which show that mostly 
low income earners receive Riester subsidies.  
The discrepancy can be explained by the already mentioned difference between income 
concepts in the two data sets. While the data from the Subsidy Office is based on individual 
labor income earned in the previous year (the base relevant for subsidy computation), the 
SAVE data records total disposable household income and thus also includes labor income 
earned by a spouse and other forms of income such as income from assets and transfers. Since 
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the welfare position of a household is better described by its overall disposable income rather 
than labor income of a single partner, we are convinced that our broader income measure is a 
more appropriate criterion in assessing whether a target group has been reached by the Riester 
subsidies.16 
The difference between our results and those by the administrative data suggests that many 
subsidy recipients with low labor income have other income sources which they use to 
accumulate pension savings.17 A recent analysis based on income tax returns confirms this 
view. It shows that Riester-pensions are most prominent among declared household incomes 
between 30.000 € and 100.000€; they are less prevalent among low and very high earners 
(Kriete-Dodds and Vorgrimler, 2007). 
4. Multivariate analyses and displacement effects 
Section 3 has evaluated bivariate relationships. In this section, we now evaluate the impact of 
household characteristics on the uptake of supplemental pensions using a multivariate 
regression approach. We also take account of many additional variables, specifically 
competing motives for saving and indicators which reflect knowledge about the pension 
system and general financial matters. 
As already pointed out, Riester pensions are not the only vehicle for voluntary contract-based 
retirement saving. We therefore employ a bivariate probit regression model, in which the 
decision to take up a subsidized Riester pension plan and the decision to enroll in other 
unsubsidized private pension plans are modeled simultaneously. In other words, we model 
                                                 
16 The Subsidy Office, for example, classifies a wife working in a low-paid part-time job as being on a low 
income, even if the husband was on a high salary. In our analysis using the SAVE data, we assign such couples to 
the upper income bracket. 
17 Second, a more technical issue is the unit of reference based on which the calculated proportions are calculated. 
While we relate the rates of participation in the Riester pension scheme to all households in the population as a 
whole, Stolz and Rieckhoff (2005, 2006) calculate their proportional figures from within the group of allowance 
beneficiaries. This latter approach neglects the distribution of the observed characteristics in the total population. 
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unobserved factors influencing both the demand for Riester products and other private pension 
plans which might be correlated. 
Table 6 presents the results of two bivariate probit regression specifications. Specification A 
describes disposable income as a set of four quintile indicators. Specification B employs a 
quadratic function of disposable income. In both specifications, the first dependent variable, 
shown in columns 1 and 3, indicates whether a household has a Riester pension plan, while the 
second dependent variable, shown in columns 2 and 4, indicates whether a household has an 
unsubsidized private pension plan. All variables refer to the end of year 2005. 
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Table 6: Determinants of the demand for Riester and other private pension products  
(bivariate probit estimates)  
 
 
Specification A Specification B 
Variable  
Riester Other private 
pensions 
Riester Other private 
pensions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Demographics:     
Age 0.139 0.028 0.141 0.031 
 (5.08)*** (1.25) (5.19)*** (1.38)  
(Age)2 -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 
 (6.12)*** (1.84)* (6.24)*** (1.98)**  
Female (dummy) -0.111 0.023 -0.100 -0.028 
 (1.54)  (0.35) (1.39) (0.41) 
Married (dummy) 0.049 -0.192 0.046 -0.178 
 (0.61) (2.49)** (0.57) (2.32)** 
Number of children  0.153 -0.014 0.155 -0.012 
 (5.54)*** (0.49) (5.62)*** (0.42) 
Education:     
High school diploma (Abitur) (dummy) 0.082 0.150 0.074 0.147 
 (0.84) (1.69)* (0.76) (1.66)* 
No vocational training (dummy) -0.341 -0.418 -0.361 -0.436 
 (2.43)** (3.22)*** (2.59)*** (3.39)*** 
University degree (dummy) -0.022 0.218 -0.080 0.194 
 (0.17) (1.88)* (0.14) (1.67)* 
Occupation:     
White collar worker (dummy) -0.074 0.154 -0.066 0.166 
 (0.81) (1.74)* (0.72) (1.88)* 
Tenured civil servant (dummy) 0.028 0.231 -0.021 0.228 
 (0.20) (1.80)* (0.15) (1.78)** 
Self-employed (dummy) -0.117 0.456 -0.107 0.460 
 (0.88) (4.12)*** (0.81) (4.16)*** 
Unemployed (dummy) 0.079 -0.147 0.040 -0.184 
 (0.67) (1.24) (0.35) (1.58)* 
Income:     
Disposable income: 1. Quintile -0.202 -0.352 - - 
 (1.45) (2.69)***   
Disposable income: 2. Quintile 0.027 -0.204 - - 
 (0.25) (-1.91)*   
Disposable income: 3. Quintile 
 Reference category 
Disposable income: 4. Quintile -0.138 -0.064 - - 
 (1.41) (0.68)   
Disposable income: 5. Quintile -0.167 0.004 - - 
 (1.55) (0.04)   
Disposable income: - - 0.001 0.101 
   (0.02) (1.81)* 
(Disposable income)^2 - - -0.006 -0.005 
   (0.74) (0.99)  
Wealth:     
Net assets 0.018 0.084 0.019 0.077 
 (0.76) (3.31)*** (0.85) (3.02)*** 
(Net assets)2  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.46) (-2.52)** (0.46) (2.39)** 
Property owner (dummy) 0.081 -0.093 0.067 -0.084 
 (0.93) (1.06) (0.77) (0.97) 
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Table 6: Determinants of the demand for Riester and other private pension products  
(continued) 
 
Financial knowledge:     
Contact with tax adviser (dummy) 0.019 0.158 0.029 0.157 
 (0.25) (2.27)** (0.39) (2.25)** 
No awareness of anticipated replacement rate -0.119 -0.099 -0.119 -0.106 
 (1.64)* (1.43) (1.64)* (1.53)  
Saving motives:     
Intention to buy real estate 0.001 0.143 -0.001 0.147 
 (0.01) (1.67)* (0.01) (1.71)*  
Reason for saving: Buy real estate -0.090 -0.057 -0.089 -0.058 
 (2.11)* (1.39) (2.08)** (1.43) 
Reason for saving: Provide for unforeseen events -0.096 -0.057 -0.086 -0.052 
 (1.44) (0.86) (1.28) (0.79) 
Reason for saving: Pay off debts -0.055 -0.041 -0.054 -0.043 
 (1.24) (0.99) (1.22) (1.03) 
Reason for saving: Old-age provision 0.229 0.694 0.218 0.691 
 (3.06)*** (7.87)*** (2.92)*** (7.86)*** 
Reason for saving: Holiday 0.009 -0.068 0.012 -0.069 
 (0.18) (1.49) (0.25) (1.51) 
Reason for saving: Finance major purchases 0.042 0.039 0.035 0.037 
 (0.81) (0.77) (0.68) (0.72) 
Reason for saving: Finance (grand)child education -0.038 -0.091 -0.038 -0.094 
 (0.81) (2.02)** (0.80) (2.09)** 
Reason for saving: Inheritance -0.124 0.090 -0.128 0.090 
 (2.32)** (1.80)* (2.39)** (1.80)* 
Reason for saving: State subsidies 0.264 -0.015 0.269 0.008 
 (6.03)*** (0.38) (6.13)*** (0.20) 
Alternative instruments:     
Other form of suppl. pension provision (dummy) 0.469 0.462 0.466 0.466 
 (6.27)*** (6.56)*** (6.25)*** (6.64)*** 
     
Constant -3.936 -2.714 -4.023 -3.069 
 (6.30)*** (4.98)*** (6.69)*** (5.84)*** 
     
Mc-Fadden R²           0.137           0.136 
Rho [Chi²(1)]           0.055 [1.32]           0.060 [1.54] 
Number of observations                2255                2255 
     
Note: Absolute value of the z statistics in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10% confidence interval, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1% 
 
The regressions have a very satisfactory fit, here measured as McFadden’s R-squared, see the 
lower part of table 6. Moreover, the estimated model indeed exhibits a positive correlation 
between the two equations, or, more precisely, between the unobservables in the decision to 
take up a subsidized Riester pension plan and the decision to enroll in unsubsidized private 
pension plans. The bivariate probit model therefore provides some efficiency gains relative to 
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two separate probit regressions. The correlation, however, is small and not statistically 
significant. 
In the following discussion, we will first focus on Riester pension plans (columns 1 and 3) and 
then move on to other private pension products (columns 2 and 4). 
4.1  Who has taken up Riester pensions? 
The upper part of Table 6 contains coefficients of the most important socio-demographic 
characteristics. Personal characteristics such as age, gender, and education refer to the financial 
respondent of the household.  
Age is specified as a quadratic function. The estimated age profile is similar to the one reported 
in figure 5: the probability of taking up a Riester pension increases initially, reaches its 
maximum at the age of about 40 and then falls steadily towards retirement age. Using higher 
order polynomials does not significantly affect the shape of the age profile.18 
The number of children is highly significant. The strong relationship between taking up a 
Riester pension and the number of children already depicted in figure 6 is robust and persists 
even if the influence of additional household characteristics is taken into account. 
The financial respondent’s gender, marital status, and occupational status have statistically 
insignificant coefficients. Financial respondents with a high school diploma that qualifies for 
university admission are statistically no more likely to have enrolled in a Riester pension. This 
insignificant result is interesting because it appears to contradict the bivariate pattern depicted 
in figure 7 and the coefficient on vocational training, which is highly significant. One 
interpretation is that the more theoretical general schooling is less suited as an indicator for 
financial knowledge than the more practical vocational training. 
The next group of variables in the regression concerns the financial situation of the surveyed 
households. We test the robustness of the income effect by using two specifications for 
                                                 
18  Not shown. Available from the authors upon request. 
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disposable household income. In specification A we include household income using a set of 
dummy variables indicating income quintiles (reference category is the third income quintile). 
Only households in the bottom income quintile have a weakly significant lower probability in 
2005 of having a Riester pension than households in the medium income range; all other 
quintile indicators are insignificant. Thus, households with very low incomes have lower 
uptake rates of Riester pensions, while there is no measurable difference among the higher 
income quintiles. To investigate the sensitivity of this result, the second regression variant 
involves a quadratic specification. This specification B does not show significant t-statistics, 
although the polynomial coefficients are jointly significant (p-value 0.0625). Using higher 
order polynomials yields similar results.19 
Being unemployed has no additional effect on taking up Riester pensions, neither does the 
value of other financial assets, specified again as a quadratic polynomial. 
Two variables are designed to capture how well a household is informed about financial 
matters and the pension system. First, we include a dummy variable which indicates contact 
with a tax advisor. This variable is insignificant. A second variable indicates the ability of the 
financial respondent to estimate the correct replacement rate of public old-age pensions (i.e., 
the expected retirement income relative to the expected pre-retirement income). This variable 
is significantly negative at a 10% confidence level:20 respondents who lack knowledge about 
their future income in old age are less likely to enrol in the Riester pension scheme. The 
causality of this relationship is unclear, however, as households which opt for a Riester pension 
are usually informed by their financial advisors about their statutory pension entitlements 
during the sales process. Hence, households tend to learn the correct replacement rate during 
the decision-making process. 
                                                 
19  See footnote above. 
20 For the precise wording of this question, refer to the appendix. 
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Saving decisions are complex and may involve psychological aspects not captured by the 
conventional set of socio-economic variables. We have therefore included a set of variables in 
the regression which reflect the importance of different saving motives for respondents. We are 
specifically interested in three saving motives: the acquisition of real estate, the wish to 
bequeath wealth, and pocketing state subsidies.  
First, there is evidence pointing to a possible displacement effect between old-age provision 
and real estate purchase. This is apparent when looking at households who report a particular 
interest in saving for the purchase of real estate property. The more important this savings 
motive is, the less likely respondents have taken up a Riester pension plan. 
A second significantly negative coefficient is attached to the variable indicating a wish to save 
for a bequest. Our interpretation is that the requirement for Riester plans to be paid out as an 
annuity acts as a disincentive for households for whom making a bequest is an important 
saving motive. 
Third, the high level of subsidization was designed as an enticement to attract savers towards 
Riester pensions. Do respondents confirm this? Indeed, our findings show a strongly 
significant positive coefficient, demonstrating that households for which state subsidies 
represent an important savings motive are most likely to take up a Riester pension plan.  
We conclude that, as far as old-age pension provision and the three mentioned saving motives 
are concerned, expressed attitudes to savings correspond with actual saving behavior. 
As mentioned earlier, Riester pension plans and unsubsidized provate pension plans are not the 
only vehicles for supplemental old age provision. In addition, there are occupational pension 
plans. Moreover, whole life insurance products have been very popular as instruments to 
provide a lump-sum payment immediately after retirement.21 The coefficient of a variable 
indicating the presence of such instruments is statistically significant and positive: households 
                                                 
21 See German Federal Ministry for Labor and Social Affairs (2006) 
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which are already covered by one of these alternative pension types are also more likely to 
have a Riester pension plan. One interpretation is that households who think ahead and invest 
in old-age provision at all tend to use several instruments for this purpose. As opposed to 
saving for real estate acquisition or saving for bequests, where we found substitution, this 
result gives evidence for a form of “crowding in” among pension products. 
Finally, it is informative to compare the results of Table 6, which refer to the year 2005, with 
the same regression applied to the data a year earlier.22 This comparison is interesting because 
the application procedure for Riester pensions was simplified and many eligibility criteria were 
removed in 2005 (see section 2). As a result, a large number of new Riester policies were taken 
up in 2005. In turn, with a broader range of households enrolled in 2005 than in 2004, 
households enrolled in 2004 are likely to have been better informed and have in general been 
less challenged by the complexity of savings decisions. 
We confine our analysis to two key examples: education and income. First, both variables used 
as indicators for financial education (high school exam qualifying for university admission and 
the extent to which someone is informed about the replacement level of the public pension 
system) are highly significant in the 2004 regression while they were insignificant and only 
weakly significant, respectively, in the regression using the 2005 data. Second, the significance 
of the income brackets changed.. In 2004, the two lowest income quintiles had significantly 
lower enrolment into Riester pension plans, while a year later, this was only true for the lowest 
20%. This demonstrates that the acceptance of the Riester products has reached the lowest 
income bracket in 2005, with no significant differences left in all higher income brackets. 
Summarizing our regression results regarding Riester pensions, the most important factor 
determining whether or not Riester pension plans are taken up appears to be the number of 
children. This is, as described in Section 2, also a key factor determining the size of the 
                                                 
22 The regression results for 2004 can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
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subsidy. As far as income is concerned, only the lowest 20% of the income distribution have a 
significantly lower probability of being enrolled in a Riester pension plan. The desire to 
purchase property and the wish to bequeath assets are savings motives which compete with 
taking up Riester pensions, while occupational pensions and whole life insurance are found to 
be complements rather than substitutes. 
4.2  Who has enrolled in unsubsidized private pension plans? 
In order to obtain a comprehensive picture of the diffusion of Riester pensions it is essential to 
take unsubsidized private pension plans into account. It may well be a rational decision to 
avoid the highly-regulated Riester pension and to choose a pension product which corresponds 
more closely with one's own preferences and/or which may promise a higher rate of return, 
despite foregoing the state subsidy. Bearing this in mind, columns 2 and 4 in table 6 describe 
the probability of having a private pension plan which does not qualify for state subsidies. 
The age effect is similar to the results for the Riester pension. However, in stark contrast to the 
results in the Riester pension equation, respondents with a high school degree qualifying for 
university admission are more likely to have made alternative provisions for old age. This 
effect is strongly significant. Lack of knowledge about future pension replacements rates also 
correlates negatively with enrolment into private pension plans, again pointing to the 
importance of information about the pension system and general financial education.  
As one might expect, self-employed who, for the most part, are not eligible for direct subsidies, 
have a higher demand for other private pension plans. Unmarried households are less likely to 
enroll in a private pension. 
The influence of children is another important difference to the results in the Riester pension 
equation. The number of children has no influence at all on the enrolment in unsubsidized 
pension plans. This shows that the child-related subsidies indeed attracted demand for Riester 
pension plans. 
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Income and asset effects are also strikingly different between subsidized and unsubsidized 
pension plans. The two lowest income quintiles show a significantly lower probability of 
enrolling into unsubsidized pension plans than for the middle income quintile (specification A), 
and the linear term of the polynomial is now highly significant (specification B). In contrast to 
the Riester pension equation, other financial wealth has considerable explanatory power for the 
probability to enroll in unsubsidized pension plans. 
The indicator variables for various savings motives are largely insignificant. In contrast to the 
Riester pension equations, this also applies to the acquisition of real estate property and the 
wish to bequeath assets. For the interpretation of the latter finding, it is noteworthy that most 
unsubsidized private pension plans have an option to be paid lump-sum at retirement, in 
contrast to the mandatory annuitization of Riester products. We also included a variable 
measuring how strong the household feels motivated to save for old-age provision. The 
positive and significant coefficient shows that, as far as old-age pension provision is 
concerned, expressed attitudes correspond with actual behavior. 
"Financial support from the state" is insignificant as a savings motive. This is no surprise given 
that these forms of retirement saving do not qualify for subsidies. In contrast, this motive was 
highly significant in the Riester pension equation. Households clearly distinguish between 
forms of saving which qualify for state subsidy and those which do not; households for which 
such state support is important make conscious decisions in favor of the related products. 
  
5. Conclusions  
The recent pension reform in Germany provides helpful evidence to better understand whether 
and how voluntary state-subsidized private pension plans are able to fill the gap that will be 
created by the reduction of pay-as-you-go public pension benefits. 
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A first lesson is that new forms of subsidized saving need time before they really take off. It 
took over ten years in the U.S., for example, before Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) 
were accepted by households in the top two income tertiles. In Germany, the Riester pension 
plans have exhibited a much more dynamic growth. Growth in the first few years was very 
steep, then stalled, but then rebound after the 2005 legislative changes. Overall, growth rates 
are much higher than those experienced in the U.S.  
There are several explanations for the discontinuous development of Riester pensions. Poor 
product design is likely the cause for the initially poor performance of Riester pensions. 
Moreover, the learning process regarding the need and way to invest in old-age provision took 
time, despite heavy advertising. As people learn from their social environment, the pace of this 
development depends on how widespread such pensions are in the population at large ("critical 
mass", Ruprecht 2004), generating exponential growth until saturation is reached. 
We cannot exactly identify whether the dynamic spread of Riester pensions is due to the 
financial incentives, the availability of information, or the marketing efforts made by 
government and providers, mainly insurance companies. However, it is striking that the 
acceleration in Riester saving only kicked in after substantial simplifications had been made to 
the scheme, i.e. after the changes in regulations described in section 2, such as the introduction 
of a simpler one-off subsidy application and the reduction of eligibility criteria. Therefore, an 
important second lesson is to avoid complex savings plans which are not immediately 
understood by customers. It now takes time to make up for the damage which has been caused 
by excessive complexity. 
The target groups of the Riester reform in 2001 were mainly families with children and 
individuals with low income. Among those, parents with more than one child were best 
reached. Given the increased child benefit of €300 per child which will be available for 
children born after 2007, it seems that Riester pension plans will almost certainly become more 
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widespread among new parents. It remains to be seen whether this subsidy increase will result 
in households switching from existing unsubsidized savings vehicles to the subsidized Riester 
pension plans, and whether it will stimulate additional saving. 
The evidence is less compelling for the other target group, low-income households. While 
administrative data of subsidy beneficiaries based on previous year's earned income show that 
people with below average earnings make up almost 70% of beneficiaries, our SAVE data on 
disposable household income tells another story. The share of households with Riester 
pensions is much lower in the lowest quintile of household income distribution than in the 
middle and upper income brackets. A third lesson is therefore that even deep subsidies do not 
appear to provide a sufficiently strong incentive to households with very low incomes to 
postpone current consumption in favor of retirement consumption. 
Households with higher levels of educational attainment are more likely to enroll in Riester 
pensions than households with financial respondents who have not completed any vocational 
training. Similarly, knowing future pension replacement levels correlates positively with 
enrolling in private pension schemes. A fourth lesson, therefore, is that information and the 
knowledge about arrangements relating to old-age pension provision are clearly vital to 
achieving high uptake rates. 
Finally, we have gained new insights about possible displacement effects. While the SAVE 
data does not allow for a cleanly designed experiment, they provide circumstantial evidence. 
First, households who desire to purchase real estate property are significantly less likely to 
have a Riester pension plan. The clumsy withdrawal rule offered by the Riester regulations 
clearly do not provide these households with sufficient liquidity in order to persuade them to 
make provision for old age alongside with saving to acquire real estate property. We find 
similar evidence that stated bequest motives displace Riester pension plans with their strict 
annuity rules. We do not conclude that these restrictions should be alleviated. On the contrary, 
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they are needed since Riester pensions are designed to fill the gap in public pension benefits 
after pension reform, and these pay-as-you-go pensions are paid out as a life-long annuity. 
While the desire to purchase property and the wish to bequeath assets are saving motives which 
compete with taking up Riester pensions, occupational pensions and whole life insurance are 
found to be complements rather than substitutes. This is an important fifth lesson. One 
interpretation is that households which think ahead and invest in old-age provision tend to use 
several instruments for this purpose. In this sense, there are “crowding in” effects of fostering 
retirement saving. 
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6. Appendix 
Relevant questionnaire items 
 
1. Did your or your partner hold one of the following types of pension savings contracts in 
December 200X? 
- Occupational pension scheme, e.g. occupational pensions from type A (Pensionsfonds) or 
type B (Pensionskasse) staff pension fund and provident funds as well as occupational 
direct pension promises or direct insurance schemes 
- State-subsidized private pension scheme (“Riester pension”), i.e. state-promoted and  
certified savings accounts which cannot be liquidated prior to retirement 
- Other contractually agreed private pension scheme, e.g. investment funds geared 
specifically to the provision of pension cover, private pension insurance policies which 
are not promoted by the state or which were taken out before such support was available. 
- No none of these, or already paid out.  
 
2. What percentage of your anticipated last wage/salary will you receive as your pension 
from the state pension insurance or civil service scheme? 
- Estimated percentage:  
- Do not know; not possible to estimate  
- Does not apply - I have already retired or I am self-employed  
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